Salt Lake City, a legal and political subdivision v. Utah State Tax Commission ex rel, Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
Salt Lake City, a legal and political subdivision v.
Utah State Tax Commission ex rel, Mountain States
Telephone & Telegraph Company : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David E. Yocom; Salt Lake County Attorney; Karl L. Hendricksen; Deputy County Attorney; Bill
Thomas Peters; Special Deputy County Attorney; Attorneys for Salt Lake County, Appellant; Steven
W. Allred; Deputy Salt Lake City Attorney; Attorney for Salt Lake City, Appellant; Holme Reoberts
& Owen; Mark K. Buchi; Richie D. Haddock; Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph; Attorneys
for Mountain State Telephone & Telegraph Company.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Salt Lake City v. Tax Commission, No. 880249.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2206
DOCi 
KF 
45.9 
.S9 
DOCK 
M"NT 
LT NO. 
BRIEF, 
ItCZH) 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a legal and 
political subdivision, 
Plaintiff, 
v •
 i 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION \ 
ex rel, MOUNTAIN STATES 
TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH ] 
COMPANY, ] 
Respondents. ] 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a legal and 
political subdivision, ] 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
ex rel, MOUNTAIN STATES ] 
TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY, 
Respondents. 
I Case NOS. 880249/880250 
i Consolidated as Case 
1 NO. 880249 
i PRIORITY 14A 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
David E. Yocom, #A3851 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
Karl L. Hendrickson, #A14 64 
Deputy County Attorney 
Bill Thomas Peters, #A2574 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(Attorneys for Salt Lake 
County, Appellant) 
Steven W. Allred, #A60 
Deputy Salt Lake City Attorney 
(Attorney for Salt Lake City, 
Appellant) 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
Mark K. Buchi #0475 
Richie D. Haddock #4585 
50 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH 
Ted Smith #3017 
250 Bell Plaza, Suite 1614 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(Attorneys for Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Company) 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a legal and ] 
political subdivision, ] 
Plaintiff, 
V • 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION ] 
ex rel, MOUNTAIN STATES ] 
TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH ] 
COMPANY, ; 
Respondents. ] 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a legal and 
political subdivision, ; 
Plaintiff, | 
v. ] 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION | 
ex rel, MOUNTAIN STATES ] 
TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH ] 
COMPANY, 
Respondents. ] 
Case Nos. 880249/880250 
i Consolidated as Case 
) No. 880249 
PRIORITY 14A 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
David E. Yocom, #A3851 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
Karl L. Hendrickson, #A1464 
Deputy County Attorney 
Bill Thomas Peters, #A2574 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(Attorneys for Salt Lake 
County, Appellant) 
Steven W. Allred, #A60 
Deputy Salt Lake City Attorney 
(Attorney for Salt Lake City, 
Appellant) 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
Mark K. Buchi #0475 
Richie D. Haddock #4585 
50 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH 
Ted Smith #3017 
250 Bell Plaza, Suite 1614 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(Attorneys for Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Company; 
The parties to this proceeding are as follows: 
David E. Yocom, #A3851 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
Karl L. Hendrickson, #A1464 
Deputy County Attorney 
Bill Thomas Peters, #A2574 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(Attorneys for Salt Lake 
County, Appellant) 
Steven W. Allred, #A60 
Deputy Salt Lake City Attorney 
(Attorney for Salt Lake City, 
Appellant) 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
Mark K. Buchi #0475 
Richie D. Haddock #4585 
50 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH 
Ted Smith #3017 
250 Bell Plaza, Suite 1614 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(Attorneys for Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Company) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
L. A. Dever 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(Attorneys for Utah State 
Tax Commission) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
INTRODUCTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 3 
I. Whether this appeal is moot because the underlying 
tax disputes have been finally and conclusively 
resolved 3 
II. Whether the Utah State Tax Commission properly 
denied the motion of Salt Lake City and Salt Lake 
County to intervene in an administrative tax 
appeal initiated by Mountain Bell 3 
III. Whether the Utah State Tax Commission has the 
legislatively mandated authority to determine a 
taxpayer's sales and use tax liability without the 
participation of local taxing jurisdictions 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 11 
I. BECAUSE THE SUBSTANTIVE TAX ISSUES INVOLVED IN 
THIS PROCEEDING HAVE BEEN RESOLVED, THE PROCEDURAL 
QUESTION RAISED BY THE LOCALITIES IS MOOT AND THIS 
APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED 11 
II. THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION PROPERLY DENIED SALT 
LAKE CITY AND SALT LAKE COUNTY THE RIGHT TO 
INTERVENE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL BROUGHT BY 
MOUNTAIN BELL 15 
A. The Utah State Tax Commission Has Plenary 
Authority Under The State Constitution And 
The Utah Code Over Administration Of The 
Sales And Use Tax 16 
B. The Applicable Sales And Use Tax Statutes 
Vest Exclusive Authority To Determine Local 
Sales And Use Tax Liability In The Utah State 
Tax Commission 18 
i 
C. The Agreements Between The Commission And 
Salt Lake City And Salt Lake County Authorize 
The Commission To Determine Local Sales And 
Use Tax Liability 21 
D. Salt Lake City And Salt Lake County Have Not 
Established A Right To Intervene 24 
E. Intervention By Local Taxing Jurisdictions 
Into Commission Proceedings Would Disrupt The 
Efficient Operation Of The State's Taxing 
Scheme 34 
III. SALT LAKE CITY AND SALT LAKE COUNTY ARE NOT 
ENTITLED TO REVIEW MOUNTAIN BELL'S CONFIDENTIAL 
TAX RECORDS 38 
CONCLUSION 4 3 
Exhibit A 
Exhibit B 
Exhibit C 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth. 300 U.S. 227, 241 
(1937) 8 , 15 
Baker v. Wade. 743 F.2d 236, 243 (5th Cir. 1984) 25 
Bush v. Viterna. 740 F.2d 350, 351-54 (5th Cir.) 19 
County of Los Angeles v. Davis. 440 U.S. 628, 631 (1979) 14 
Horn v. Eltra Corp.. 686 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1982) 8,12,13 
In re Tanner. 549 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah 1976) 34 
Johnson v. Sandy City Corp.. 497 P.2d 644, 645 (Utah 
1972) 18 
Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County. 702 P.2d 451, 454 
(Utah 1985) 29,32 
McKniaht v. State Land Board. 381 P.2d 726, 730 (Utah 
1963) 4 0 
Merkley v. State Tax Commission. 358 P.2d 991, 992 (Utah 
1961) 19 
Non-Commissioned Officers Ass/n v. Army Times Pub. Co.. 
637 F.2d 372, 373 (5th Cir. 1981) 13 
Parker v. Provo Citv Corp.. 543 P.2d 769, 770 (Utah 1974) 19 
Parker v. Provo Citv Corp.. 543 P.2d 769, 770 (Utah 1975) 23 
Petty v. State Board of Regents. 595 P.2d 1299 (Utah 
1979) 34 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Dept. of Employment Security. 657 
P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah 1982) 34 
Smith v. Turner. 362 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1961) 34 
State Tax Commission v. Katsis. 62 P.2d 120, (Utah 1936) 22,30 
Terracor v. Board of State Lands & Forestry. 716 P.2d 
796, 798 (Utah 1986) 28 
iii 
Tosco Corp. v. Hodel. 804 F.2d 590, 591-92 (10th Cir 
1986) 12 
Warth v. Seldin. 422 U.S. 490, 499-502 (1975) 32 
Wells Fargo Bank. N.A. v. Midwest Realty & Finance. Inc.. 
544 P.2d 882, 885 (Utah 1975) 23 
CONSTITUTIONS 
Utah Const, art XI, §§ 4, 5 18 
Utah Const, art XIII, §11 16,17,25 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-202(3) (1987) 16 
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-206(1) (1987) 16 
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-206(3) (1987) 16 
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-206(5) (1987) 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-403 11,39,40 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-403(1) 41 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-403 (b) 40 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-403 (3) (b) 40 
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-210(5) (1987) 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-501 31 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-503(1) 31 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12 4 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-101 (1987) 1,17 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-101-119 (1987 and Supp. 1989) 20 
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-103 (1987) 6,19 
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-114 (1987) 31 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-118 (1987) 9,17,21, 
22 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-201 (1987) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-203 (1987) 19 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-204 3 6,37 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-204(1) (Supp. 1988) 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-204(3) (Supp. 1988) 9,20 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-204(4) 20,21,22 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-204 (6) (b) (Supp. 1988) 9 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-205(1) (Supp. 1988) 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-205(2) 19 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-206 (1987) 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-16(h) (Supp. 1988) 34,40 
RULES 
Rule 37(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 8,12 
Rule 24(a), U.R.Civ.P (1987 24,28 
Utah Admin. R. R861-05A-G (1988) 25,26,27 
Utah Admin. R. R861-05A-H (1988) 25,26 
Utah Admin. R. R861-12A-E (1988) 41 
Utah Admin. R. R861-12A-F (1988) 42 
Tax Commission Rule R865-19-90S 6,11,14 
RESOLUTIONS 
Senate Joint Resolution No. 12 (Feb. 2, 1989) 7,11,14 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 
(1987) 14 
7C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1917 
(1986) 13 
13A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 3533.2 (1984) 8,12 
Local Sales and Use Tax Act, Codified at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-201 et sea 23,37 
v 
INTRODUCTION 
iA- Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Compai n i 'I i in I  ill mi in mi -i I mi i l l i I a IJ[ -"J L I h 
t h e Utah : : J U 4ax -, ommissic. ommiss ion"I s e e k i n g rev iew nf 
two s t a t u t o r y s a l e s and HSP f ix d e f i c i e n c y n o t i c e s , Fo l l owing 
t h e ump I H iiiiii M| I . in mi in lii i ! I ||ii eiuiut.es i\ a i I uli1 u I i a l l a g g r i e v e d 
Utah t a x p a y e r s , t h e p r o t e s t e d i s s u e s were r e s o l v e d The 
s u b s t a n t i v e q i i n s t i n nr- t b 11 11 ir* r imp t ed t h i s p r o c e e d 11 IH |i I h »-j re f i f 
have been a u t h o r i t a t i v e ! / and i i n a l l y s e t t l e d . Fins m a t t e i 
comes b e f o r e t h e Court s o l e l y b e c a u s e S a l t Lake C i t y and S a l t 
Laf' p rv.i|n,» ! i . 0 | 1 Pi » v e I , * I . \ I i i i » i>i«y • I i e 
d e n i e d il I i ILJIII lu i n t e r v e n e in t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
proceedings. 
'Thinn prcH.-'eduj; <i I i if in e s t I on pi eseiiitieill1 I iy t Ih i"•'•• i si" i , e , , 
whether local taxing jurisdictions have the right to intervene 
in proceedings initiated by taxpayers before the Commission 
in i in Il I iinj mi s u b j e , l LI.I jlid j i,„ i J I r e s o l e ! J in because I he dispute 
between Mountain Bell and the Commission is moot, III1 ITI If the 
underlyinq dispute were not in it „ however, the Commissi nn 
properly resolved this proceduiai issue by letusing to .illow the 
localI ties to intervene 
The Commission i s eha rqed Willi a d j i u u i s t e i i nn ..uiii i 
Utah s t a t e s a l e s am in, J use t ax (Utah h'ode Ann, k &9-12-10I e t s e q . 
(1987)) and any a p p l i c a b l e l o c a l s a l e s and use t ax (Utah Code 
IIIIII i i I II I el, a eg » | I I ' in in II in i n ! i mi i l l i I. , 11 i I  
plenary authority to ascertain and assess these sales and use 
taxes, the Commission represents the interests of the state and 
its more than 260 local governmental units. Intervention by 
local taxing jurisdictions in Commission proceedings, therefore, 
is unauthorized. Intervention, which is granted in the 
Commission's sound discretion, is also unnecessary where the 
interests of proposed intervenors — like the localities here — 
are already represented by the Commission. Moreover, permitting 
intervention by hundreds of taxing jurisdictions would 
unnecessarily complicate Commission procedures and unduly burden 
taxpayers who, like Mountain Bell, do business throughout the 
state. 
Over the years, the Commission — pursuant to 
legislative mandate — has dutifully guarded both the financial 
interests of the State and its constituent taxing jurisdictions. 
Indeed, no local governmental entity has heretofore challenged, 
either in court or in the legislature, the Commission's 
established plenary authority to administer, collect and 
distribute tax revenues. Now, apparently disgruntled with the 
scope of the Commission's authority and their own limited role 
in the administration of the local sales and use tax, the 
localities seek to upset an established legislative scheme by 
arguing that the Commission is not properly representing local 
fiscal interests. This unsupported contention is both improper 
and erroneous. 
• " CEMENT OF' Till!1: rSRIIMR 
I. whether this appeal is moot becaus = the ui ider lyii ig tax 
disputes have been finally and con* :: J i isi vely resolved, 
Whether the Utah State 'Tax C'oiiin :i ssi 01 i properly denied 
the motion of Salt Lake City and Sal t Lake County to 
intervene in an administrate ve tax appeal i nitiated by 
Mountain Bell, 
III Whether the Utah State Tax Commission has the 
legislatively mandated authority to determine a 
taxpayer's sales and use tax liability without the 
participation of local taxing jurisdictions. 
! i\TEMENT OF THE CASE 
nil nprenibPi in 1 nnn I In I ml 11 i iimf D i i 11 m il I In 
Utih State lax Commission ("Auditing Uivi >ion") issued L o 
''Statutory Motic€i[s] of Deticiency and Amended Audit Report" 
! I Ml l l l l l t I I III 1 ' P I II II II II I I I I l l II I I ' I I i l l 1 I II III Il * | HI I ) | H J " , I I II 
adjustments'1 to Mountain Bell s sales rind use tax ' iab;1:4-'7 
for t'hp period from January 1 l(-*8l through March ^ a * . 
h e i : u j (II in I II i II II II II inI II 11 II II 1 1 h i i i n | i L i I II Ih in 
two Petitions tor Hearing and Redetermination of Tax 
Deficiency ^«petitions1* ) with the Commission Re '"ord a+; ! 
lliu .ule purpose of I hu administrative proceedings initiate 
by the Petitions wa < to establish the P K f * 111 if any, of 
Mountain Bell' s sales and lira' tax I j n111 I 11 \ Rec 
1 :i -1 •-• I B "J" . 
Both Petitions raised complicated questions ot first 
j l i ipn.^Vi l u l l i . "L i t Jin) II i I l u l u i uiiiJiiuiiiL MI I lui iL. . i L I L L L I I I I ' I 
Aiiioncj o t h e r l e s s s l yn i i i c a n t m a l l e i s , unit ul I he P e t i t i o n s 
challenged the Auditing Division's proposal that certain non-
recurring telecommunications charges be included in Mountain 
Bell's Utah sales and use tax base ("Non-Recurring Charges 
Petition"). The other Petition challenged the Auditing 
Division's proposal that the sale of interstate access 
services by Mountain Bell to interexchange carriers be 
included in the tax base ("Access Services Petition"). 
Record at 184-217. 
Following the filing of the Petitions, Mountain Bell 
and the Commission conducted informal conferences permitted 
by Commission rule to resolve the issues raised by both 
administrative appeals. In a letter to the Attorney General 
dated February 4, 1988, attorneys for Salt Lake County 
requested copies of the Petitions. A similar letter was sent 
to the Commission on February 14, 1988, seeking access to and 
review of the following documents: (1) the sales and use tax 
audit performed by the Commission of Mountain Bell for the 
period January 1, 1983 through March 31, 1986; (2) the 
Petitions; and (3) any other relevant correspondence. On 
February 8, 1988, the Attorney General responded that, before 
the requested copies would be provided, it would be "most 
prudent" to await an order of the Commission granting 
intervention.1 The Attorney General accordingly instructed 
1/ A reference to the fact that the Petitions had not been 
provided to Salt Lake County for review was made in Salt 
Lake County's Motion for an Order Permitting Intervention 
that was filed before the Commission on April 8, 1988. 
Record at 85. 
the attorney for Salt Lake County to file "a short petition 
for intervention." Record at 122. On April 8, 1988, both 
Salt Lake County and Salt Lake City filed motions to 
intervene in the Commission proceedings. Record at 122. 
After hearing the arguments of Salt Lake County, 
Salt Lake City, the Attorney General and Mountain Bell, the 
Commission denied the motions to intervene and Salt Lake 
County's request to review the documents.2 The Order 
specifically found that, given the Commission's plenary 
authority to administer state and local sales and use taxes, 
the localities were not entitled to intervene in the 
administrative proceedings. As for Salt Lake County's 
request for documents, the Order found that the 
administration and collection contracts between the 
Commission and the localities, relied upon by the localities, 
did not provide the localities with access to confidential 
taxpayer information or authorize the localities to 
participate in the Commission's administrative determination 
and collection of taxes. Rather, the contractual provisions 
were merely intended to permit the localities to review 
certain records in order to determine that sales and use tax 
revenues had, in fact, been properly allocated and 
distributed to the respective localities. Record at 39. 
2/ May 26, 1988 Order on Motion to Intervene and Request to 
Review Certain Documents & Records ("Order"). 
On June 24, 1988, Salt Lake County appealed the 
Commission's Order to this Court. On June 27, 1988, Salt 
Lake City filed a similar appeal, asking the Court to direct 
the Commission to certify to the Court the complete record of 
proceedings and the entire file, together with all other 
documents. This Court granted the Writ of Review on July 5, 
1988, and the appeals were subsequently consolidated. Record 
at 21, 23. On July 15, 1988, Mountain Bell filed a Motion 
for Amended Writ of Review, and Alternative Motion for 
Protective Order to Seal Tax Information of Mountain Bell. 
Mountain Bell asked this Court to modify its July 5, 1988, 
Writ of Review to include only the documents that were 
relevant to the issue of intervention. On the same day, 
Mountain Bell filed a Motion for a Protective Order, again 
seeking to protect the confidentiality of any and all 
information relating to Mountain Bell's tax returns for the 
audit period. On September 19, 1988, this Court entered a 
protective order to seal the tax information and records of 
Mountain Bell. Record at 1. 
Subsequent to the denial of the motions to 
intervene, the Commission and Mountain Bell entered into an 
agreement completely and finally resolving the issues raised 
by the Non-Recurring Charges Petition. Pursuant to that 
agreement, the Commission promulgated Utah Sales Tax Rule 
R865-19-90S, entitled ''Telephone Service Defined Pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103" (the "Rule"). A copy of the Rule 
is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The rule was circulated for 
public comment in accordance with the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act and became effective as of March 17, 1989, 
with retroactive application to July 1, 1988. 
The second Petition was resolved by legislative 
action. By Senate Joint Resolution No. 12, dated February 2, 
1989 ("SJR 12"), the Utah Legislature expressed its intent 
that charges for the purchase of interstate access services 
were not to be subject to sales and use tax unless and until 
the legislature specifically provides for such taxation. A 
copy of SJR 12 is attached hereto as Exhibit B. By a Second 
Statutory Notice and Amended Sales and Use Tax Audit Summary 
dated May 11, 1989 (the "Amended Notice"), the Auditing 
Division informed Mountain Bell that, in accordance with the 
legislative intent expressed in SJR 12, it had withdrawn its 
proposed assessment of sales and use tax on the purchase of 
interstate access services. A copy of the Amended Notice is 
attached hereto as Exhibit C. SJR 12 accordingly resolved 
the issues raised by the Access Services Petition. 
On July 10, 1989, attorneys for Mountain Bell 
informed attorneys for Salt Lake County of the resolution of 
the issues contained in Petitions and requested that the 
localities withdraw this appeal on grounds of mootness. On 
July 12, 1989, attorneys for Mountain Bell were informed that 
the localities would not withdraw their appeal. On 
September 1, 1989, Mountain Bell filed a Suggestion of 
Mootness pursuant to Rule 37(a) of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Because all of the issues raised by Mountain Bell's 
Petitions have been settled or withdrawn, the question of the 
localities' right to intervene has been rendered moot. 
Horn v. Eltra Corp., 686 F.2d 439, 442 (6th Cir. 1982). A 
case becomes moot when a court cannot grant "specific relief 
through a decree of a conclusive character." Aetna Life 
Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937). Here, 
there is no specific relief that can be ordered by this Court 
for the simple reason that there no longer exists an 
administrative proceeding into which the localities may 
intervene. See 13A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure. § 3533.2 (1984) (resolution of the substantive 
issues in an action moots all associated procedural 
disputes). The present controversy is plainly moot and the 
appeal should, therefore, be dismissed. 
If the Court reaches the procedural issue raised by 
the localities, it should affirm the Commission's order 
denying intervention. The Utah Constitution and the Utah 
Code grant the Commission plenary authority to administer all 
matters incident to the assessment and collection of both 
state and local sales and use taxes. In particular, the 
Commission's administrative authority encompasses the 
"ascertainment, assessment, and collection" of all such 
taxes. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-118 (1987). 
Consistent with its authority, the Commission 
properly denied the localities' requests to intervene. The 
interests of the localities are already adequately 
represented by the Commission. The Commission's intervention 
rules do not authorize intervention as of right, and allow 
the Commission wide discretion in granting or denying 
intervention. In light of the Commission's plenary authority 
to administer state and local sales and use taxes, that 
discretion was not abused here. 
Moreover, nothing in the structure or substance of 
local sales and use taxes grants local taxing jurisdictions 
the right to intervene in Commission proceedings. On the 
contrary, any local sales and use tax ordinance must include 
provisions that are "substantially the same" as those of the 
state sales and use tax (Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-204(3) (Supp. 
1988). * Local taxing jurisdictions must delegate all 
functions incident to the administration or operation of 
local sales and use taxes to the Commission. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 59-12-204(4), (6)(b) (Supp. 1988). The Commission, as 
such, is empowered to represent not only the interests of the 
State, but also the interests of each of the state's 
constituent taxing authorities. 
The localities' argument that they have "standing" 
to participate in the administrative proceedings, 
-9-
furthermore, is inapposite. The concept of "standing" is not 
co-extensive with a right to intervene; many parties that 
have "standing" are nevertheless denied the right to 
interject themselves in on-going judicial or administrative 
proceedings. In any event, the localities' assertion of 
"standing" is seriously flawed. The localities' claims of 
injury — basic to any finding of standing — rest upon the 
erroneous assertion that Commission proceedings are designed 
to "compromise or settle" tax liability. In reality, 
Commission proceedings establish — rather than "compromise" 
— tax liability. 
The Commission's refusal to permit intervention is 
further supported by sound notions of public policy. To 
accept the localities' position that intervention is 
appropriate would subject Mountain Bell and all other Utah 
taxpayers to separate audit scrutiny by over 260 different 
taxing jurisdictions. As a result, the sales and use tax 
base could have 260 different interpretations. The burden 
that such wide-ranging intervention would impose upon 
taxpayers — and upon the Commission's administration of 
state-wide sales and use taxes — is enormous. Such a result 
was obviously not intended by the Utah Legislature. On the 
contrary, the Legislature actively sought to avoid cumbersome 
administration of state and local sales and use taxes by 
entrusting the Commission with broad powers over the 
ascertainment, assessment and collection of such taxes. This 
Court should not re-draft that legislative scheme. 
The localities, finally, are not entitled to review 
Mountain Bell's tax returns and related documents. Such tax 
information is protected by the confidentiality provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-403 (1987). Moreover, nothing in the 
agreements between the localities and the Commission allows 
local governmental units to review taxpayer records. Those 
agreements merely permit local taxing units to verify that 
the distribution of local sales and use tax revenues was 
proper. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE SUBSTANTIVE TAX ISSUES INVOLVED IN THIS 
PROCEEDING HAVE BEEN RESOLVED, THE PROCEDURAL QUESTION 
RAISED BY THE LOCALITIES IS MOOT AND THIS APPEAL SHOULD 
BE DISMISSED 
The administrative proceedings at issue here were 
commenced to determine whether certain non-recurring 
telecommunications charges and interstate long-distance access 
charges were properly includable in Mountain Bell's sales and 
use tax base. Those issues have now been resolved. That 
resolution, moreover, did not occur behind "a cloak of 
absolute secrecy," as the localities have asserted. Pet. Br. 
at 27. Rather, the substantive taxation questions raised by 
Mountain Bell were disposed of by public rulemaking — 
following public notice and comment — and by legislative 
action. See, e.g., Tax Commission Rule R865-19-90S (attached 
as Exhibit A); Senate Joint Resolution No. 12 (Feb. 2, 1989) 
(attached as Exhibit B). As a result, the localities' 
procedural dispute with the Commission is moot because the 
underlying tax appeals have been finally and conclusively 
settled. 
Rule 37(a) of the rules of this Court provide that it 
is "the duty of each party" to inform the Court of any 
circumstances which render "moot one or more of the issues 
raised." Rule 37(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
(emphasis added). The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 37 
reiterates the well-established principle that the 
"[Resolution of an issue" renders an appeal moot. Resolution 
of the substantive issues presented by an action, of course, 
moots all procedural questions associated with that action. 
13A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.2 
(1984); Tosco Corp. v. Hodel, 804 F.2d 590, 591-92 (10th Cir 
1986). Consequently, the parties' resolution of a dispute 
moots an appeal by a non-party of a prior denial of a motion 
to intervene. 13A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure. § 3533.2 at 236 (1984). 
In Horn v. Eltra Corp.. 686 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1982), 
the Sixth Circuit addressed a fact situation substantially 
identical to this case. In Horn, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") successfully intervened in an 
action in federal district court between Horn and defendant 
Eltra Corporation. Id. at 441-42. The district court 
subsequently revoked the EEOC's permissive intervenor status 
and the EEOC appealed to the Sixth Circuit. Zd. at 44 0. 
While the EEOC's appeal was pending, Horn and Eltra 
Corporation settled their dispute and dismissed the federal 
action with prejudice. Id. The Sixth Circuit held that 
settlement and dismissal of that action mooted the EEOC's 
appeal because of the general rule that "a prerequisite of an 
intervention (which is an ancillary proceeding in an already 
instituted suit) is an existing suit within the Court's 
jurisdiction." Id. at 440 (quoting Non-Commissioned Officers 
Ass'n v. Army Times Pub. Co., 637 F.2d 372, 373 (5th Cir. 
1981)). See also 7C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1917 (1986). The Sixth Circuit accordingly 
dismissed the EEOC's appeal. 
This case is factually indistinguishable from Horn. 
Here, the localities moved to intervene under the Commission's 
rules. The Commission, in the proper exercise of its 
discretion, denied that motion and the localities appealed. 
While that appeal was pending, however, the substantive tax 
dispute was resolved. There is, therefore, no action left 
into which the localities can attempt to intervene. 
Based on the localities' assertion that the 
Commission, through improper procedures, is compromising or 
giving away their localities' proper percentage of sales and 
use tax revenues, the localities have refused to dismiss this 
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appeal . 3 See Pet . Br. 27. Considering the present posture 
of the underlying administrat ive proceeding, however, such a 
complaint i s not properly addressed to t h i s Court. To the 
extent that the l o c a l i t i e s dispute the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and 
s ta tutory authori ty ves ted in the Commission over the 
administrat ion of s t a t e and l o c a l s a l e s and use taxes (see 
Sect ion I I , i n f r a ) , t h e i r p leas for protec t ion or 
adminis trat ive involvement should be d irec ted t o the 
l e g i s l a t u r e . Cf. Senate Jo int Resolution No. 12 (Feb. 2, 
1989)(Exhibit B). In f a c t , SJR 12 c a l l s for such input in the 
l e g i s l a t i v e committee meeting to be held in the f a l l of t h i s 
year. To the extent that the l o c a l i t i e s are unhappy with the 
substant ive d e c i s i o n s of the Commission (such as that embodied 
in Tax Commission Rule R865-19-90S) (Exhibit A), they should 
ava i l themselves of t h e i r r i g h t s under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 e t seq. (1987), and 
sue the Commission d i r e c t l y . 4 On the present record, 
there fore , further proceedings in t h i s Court are improper. 
3 / Attorneys for Mountain Bel l requested that the County 
dismiss t h i s matter on grounds of mootness. Attorneys for 
the County indicated that they would confer with the 
attorney for the City and respond. The l o c a l i t i e s refused 
to dismiss t h i s appeal. 
4 / For t h i s reason, the l o c a l i t i e s ' complaint does not f a l l 
within the exception for mootness created for cases 
"capable of r e p e t i t i o n but evading review." See, e . g . . 
County of Los Angeles v. Davis. 440 U.S. 628, 631 (1979). 
The l o c a l i t i e s have an avai lable veh ic l e for chal lenging 
the prac t i ces of the Commission outside the confines of 
t h i s administrat ive proceeding. 
This Court simply cannot grant the localities the relief they 
seek. 
For a litigated issue to remain viable there must be 
"a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific 
relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as 
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be 
upon a hypothetical state of facts." Aetna Life Insurance Co. 
v. Haworth. 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937). Here, there is no 
specific or "immediate" relief that can be ordered by this 
Court because there no longer exists an administrative 
proceeding into which the localities may intervene. The most 
this Court can do is render "an opinion advising what the law 
would be upon a hypothetical state of facts" — i.e., whether 
the Court would authorize intervention if there were, in fact, 
a proceeding currently pending before the Commission. Aetna 
Life Insurance Co.. 300 U.S. at 241. The underlying 
controversy is plainly moot and the appeal must, therefore, be 
dismissed. 
II. THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION PROPERLY DENIED SALT LAKE 
CITY AND SALT LAKE COUNTY THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL BROUGHT BY MOUNTAIN BELL 
If this Court reaches the procedural intervention 
question posed by the localities, it should affirm the order 
of the Commission denying intervention. The Utah Constitution 
and the Utah Code grant the Commission plenary authority to 
establish and collect sales and use taxes on behalf of both 
the State of Utah and its constituent taxing jurisdictions. 
-15-
That authority was properly exercised when the Commission 
denied the localities' requests to intervene. Intervention by 
local taxing jurisdictions into Commission proceedings, 
moreover, would encumber and improperly complicate the 
established legislative scheme. 
A. The Utah State Tax Commission Has Plenary Authority 
Under The State Constitution And The Utah Code Over 
Administration Of The Sales And Use Tax 
Article XIII, §11, of the Constitution of Utah 
provides that *[t]he State Tax Commission shall administer and 
supervise the tax laws of the State." The general powers and 
duties of the Commission, as defined by statute, are 
extensive. 
The Commission is composed of four members appointed 
by the governor with the consent of the Senate. Utah Const, 
art. XIII, § 11. The membership of the commission must 
include "composite skills in accounting, auditing, property 
assessment, management, law and finance." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-1-202(3) (1987). In addition to the four Commission 
members, the legislature has required appointment of an 
executive director, an administrative secretary, an internal 
audit unit, and an appeals staff. Id. § 59-1-206(1) (1987). 
Under the direction of the Commission, the executive director 
is authorized to employ whatever staff is necessary to perform 
the duties and responsibilities of the Commission. Id. 
§ 59-1-206(3) (1987). The internal audit unit, in turn, is 
responsible for assuring the proper acquisition, custody, and 
use of public funds. Id. 59-1-206(4)(a) (1987). The appeals 
office is authorized to receive and hear appeals to the 
Commission and also to conduct hearings in compliance with 
approved written rules. The four-member Commission has final 
review authority over appeals. Id. § 59-1-206(5) (1987). 
Consistent with the Utah Constitution, the 
Commission's primary obligation is "to administer and 
supervise the tax laws of the state." Utah Const, art. XIII 
§ 11. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-210(5) (1987). The Commission 
administers all sales and use taxes — both state and local --
imposed by the various taxing jurisdictions in the State. The 
Commission's administrative responsibilities are broad, 
including the power to make all necessary forms and rules "for 
the ascertainment, assessment, and collection of the taxes 
imposed under this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-118 
(1987). Pursuant to that authority, the Commission has 
administered the state sales and use tax since 1933.5 
In light of the foregoing legislative scheme, the 
localities' claim that the Commission is nothing more than a 
tax "collection agency" is absurd. The Commission's 
administration is not limited to the collection of taxes, but 
rather, includes all matters related to the ascertainment, 
assessment and collection of state and local tax revenues. 
5/ The Utah Sales and Use Tax Act (codified at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-101 et sea. (1987)) ("sales tax") imposes a tax on 
all retail sales of tangible personal property not 
otherwise exempt and on certain specified services. 
Allegations to the contrary are without constitutional, 
statutory, case law or any other legitimate support. 
B. The Applicable Sales And Use Tax Statutes Vest 
Exclusive Authority To Determine Local Sales And Use 
Tax Liability In The Utah State Tax Commission 
As set out above, the Commission has broad authority 
regarding the "ascertainment, assessment, and collection" of 
state taxes. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-118 (1987). The 
principal thrust of the localities' position is that the 
Commission's authority is somehow diminished when it comes to 
the ascertainment, assessment or collection of local sales and 
use taxes. There is nothing in the substance or structure of 
the Local Sales and Use Tax Act, however, that dilutes the 
Commission's plenary authority over the administration of 
local sales and use taxes. 
In 1959, the Legislature enacted the Local Sales and 
Use Tax Act, authorizing counties, cities and towns to impose 
a local sales and use tax by passing local taxing ordinances. 
Pursuant to the Local Sales and Use Tax Act, the localities 
have enacted a local sales and use tax ordinance. Record at 
76, 82. Adoption of a local sales and use tax, however, does 
not vest the localities with authority to participate in the 
ascertainment, assessment or collection of that tax. On the 
contrary, the applicable statutes vest exclusive authority to 
determine local sales and use tax liability in the Commission. 
Local governmental units, such as Salt Lake City and 
Salt Lake County, derive all the powers they possess from the 
state and have no powers beyond those given to them by the 
legislature. Utah Const. Art. XI, §§ 4, 5; Johnson v. Sandy 
City Corp.. 497 P.2d 644, 645 (Utah 1972). See also, Parker 
v. Provo City Corp.. 543 P.2d 769, 770 (Utah 1974) (a 
municipality has only such powers as are expressly granted to 
it by the Legislature; where any fair, reasonable, or 
substantial doubt exists regarding a municipality's powers, 
such doubt must be resolved against the municipality). It is 
clear, then, that local governmental units possess no inherent 
authority to impose a sales and use tax or administer that 
tax. The Local Sales and Use Tax is "a concession to the 
county and city that in fact is a privilege." Merklev v. 
State Tax Commission. 358 P.2d 991, 992 (Utah 1961). 
Moreover, the Legislature can — and in fact has — 
exclusively authorized the Commission to perform all of the 
administrative functions associated with the localities' 
exercise of that privilege. 
The localities' authority over the imposition and 
administration of local sales and use taxes is decidedly 
limited. Although localities may pass an ordinance imposing a 
local sales and use tax (Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-203 (1987)), 
the terms and provisions of that ordinance are specifically 
designated by the Local Sales and Use Tax Act. For example, 
section 59-12-205(2) limits the local sales and use tax rate 
to 63/64 of one percent of the purchase price, less than one-
fifth the rate of the state sales and use tax. Compare Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1987) with Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-205(2) (Supp. 1988). All local sales and use tax 
ordinances must contain provisions substantially identical to 
the provisions of the state sales and use tax. Utah Code Ann, 
§ 59-12-204(3) (Supp. 1988). The tax base for the local sales 
and use tax must be completely coextensive with the state's 
sales and use tax base. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-204(1) (Supp. 
1988) . Any local sales and use tax ordinance must contain the 
same reporting, collection, prepayment, overpayment, 
deficiency, objection, and notice provisions contained in the 
state sales and use tax. See Id. §§ 59-12-101 through 119 
(1987 and Supp. 1989). Any city or county with a local sales 
and use tax must amend its ordinance to comply with amendments 
to the state sales and use tax act within thirty days of the 
enactment of such state tax amendments. Id. § 59-12-205(1) 
(Supp. 1988) . 
Any city or county enacting a local sales and use tax 
ordinance must contract with the Commission to perform all 
functions "incident to the administration or operation of the 
ordinance." Id. § 59-12-204(4). Finally, the Commission is 
charged with transmitting the sales and use taxes collected 
pursuant to local ordinances to the proper county, city or 
town on a quarterly basis. I£. § 59-12-206 (1987). 
The foregoing statutory framework, which defines the 
local sales and use tax and allocates authority between the 
Commission and local governmental units, makes the local sales 
and use tax wholly dependent on the state sales and use tax 
and subjects that tax to administration by the Commission. 
Thus, the Commission is not merely a "collection agent" for 
the cities and counties. Rather, it has full authority to 
ascertain, assess, and collect the local sales and use taxes 
and to perform all other functions incident to the operation 
of the tax. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-118 (1987). The 
Commission, as such, is empowered to represent and administer 
not only the interests of the State, but also the interests of 
its constituent taxing authorities. As a result, the 
Commission possesses full authority to adjudicate appeals 
involving local sales and use tax issues. 
C. The Agreements Between The Commission And Salt Lake 
City And Salt Lake County Authorize The Commission 
To Determine Local Sales And Use Tax Liability 
Even assuming that the localities, in fact, possess 
some inherent authority to ascertain and assess sales and use 
taxes, they have contractually divested themselves of that 
authority. Section 59-12-204(4) provides that, with respect 
to any local sales and use tax ordinance, such ordinance 
"shall include a provision that the county shall contract, 
prior to the effective date of the ordinance, with the 
commission to perform all functions incident to the 
administration or operation of the ordinance." Id. (emphasis 
added.) This statutory provision, which applies to cities and 
towns as well as counties, is mandatory. Local governmental 
units are not afforded an option to contract. Rather, they 
are required to do so. The localities in this case have 
complied with this statutory requirement by executing an 
agreement (the "Agreement") with the Commission. See Pet. Br, 
Addenda 1 and 2. 
Each Agreement recites that it is being entered into 
to carry out the provisions of the Local Sales and Use Tax 
Act. Each provides, in conformity with the wording of section 
59-12-204(4), for the Commission to "perform exclusively all 
functions incidental to the administration and operation of 
[the local sales and use tax]." Pet. Br. Addendum 1, Art. I 
§ 1 and Addendum 2, Art. I § 1 (emphasis added). Pursuant to 
the Commission's statutory authority (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-118), the "administration" of sales and use tax 
includes the "ascertainment and assessment" of taxes, 
including the Commission's appeals process. See State Tax 
Commission v. Katsis. 62 P.2d 120, 123-24 (Utah 1936). 
Because the Agreements state that the Commission is to perform 
all functions incident to the operation of the local sales and 
use tax in addition to its administration, the language 
clearly connotes even broader authority. Therefore, the 
Agreements unequivocally authorize the Commission to 
exclusively perform the acts about which the localities now 
complain. 
By requiring local governmental units to contract 
with the Commission for purposes of the administration of 
local taxing ordinances, the Utah Legislature was clearly 
cognizant of the need for uniformity and consistency in the 
ascertainment, assessment and co l lec t ion of sa les and use tax 
revenues in the S t a t e . This provision in the Local Sales and 
Use Tax Act, therefore , i s simply a reinforcement of s imilar 
provisions in the Sales and Use Tax Act which empower the 
Commission to administer the tax laws of the S ta t e . Indeed, 
The Leg i s l a tu re ' s determination tha t the Commission i s to act 
on behalf of a l l taxing un i t s within the Sta te could not be 
s ta ted more emphatically. To a l lege otherwise, as the 
l o c a l i t i e s do, i s simply to ignore the c lear in ten t of the 
law.6 
6/ To avoid the effect of the Agreements, the l o c a l i t i e s urge 
th is Court to construe the Agreements against the 
Commission on the grounds that the Agreements were 
adhesion contracts drafted by the Commission. Pet. Br. 
26. However, no such rule of construction exis ts with 
respect to s t a tu to r i l y prescribed agreements re la t ing to 
the al locat ion of authority between the State and local 
governmental un i t s . 
The l o c a l i t i e s next allege that , to the extent there is 
any ambiguity as to the meaning of the language or terms 
of the Agreements, such ambiguity must be resolved against 
the Commission. This evasive attempt is also unavailing; 
the l o c a l i t i e s have fai led to sat isfy the prerequis i te to 
invocation of any rule regarding s t r i c t construction 
against the Commission because they have not and cannot 
demonstrate that the Agreements are ambiguous. See Wells 
Fargo Bank. N.A. v. Midwest Realty & Finance. Inc . . 544 
P.2d 882, 885 (Utah 1975). The Agreements are very c lear , 
and, in compliance with s ta tutory requirements, authorize 
the Commission to administer both the s ta te s ta tu tes and 
the local tax ordinances of the contracting local 
governmental un i t s . Moreover, a specific rule of 
construction holds that where there is any doubt with 
respect to the a l locat ion of authori ty, i t is resolved in 
favor of the State . See Parker v. Provo Citv Corp.. 543 
P.2d 769, 770 (Utah 1975). 
D. Salt Lake City And Salt Lake County Have Not 
Established A Right To Intervene 
In light of the authority vested in the Commission to 
ascertain, assess and collect all state and local sales and 
use taxes, the Commission properly denied the localities' 
motions to intervene. The localities' interests are 
adequately represented by the Commission. The Commission's 
rules, moreover, grant the Commission wide discretion in 
ordering or denying intervention. Finally, the localities' 
arguments supporting intervention, which are based on notions 
of "standing" and claimed injury arising from the Commission's 
asserted "compromise" of local sales and use tax liability, 
are inapposite and erroneous. 
Intervention, by definition, involves the 
interjection of non-parties into an on-going judicial or 
administrative proceeding. Because of the potential that 
intervention possess's to disrupt the expectations of the 
parties and unduly complicate final resolution of the original 
dispute, it is never granted when the interests of the 
proposed intervenors are already adequately represented by the 
original parties. See, e.g., Rule 24(a), U.R.Civ.P. 
(providing that even intervention as of right will be denied 
when "the applicant's interest is adequately represented by 
existing parties"). 
In this case, the interests of the localities are 
identical to the interests of the State (which are 
unquestionably represented by the Commission) — i.e., 
maximizing Mountain Bell's legitimate sales and use tax 
liability. Indeed, the State has a greater financial stake 
than the localities in the proper determination of Mountain 
Bell's liability. The localities, moreover, have not and do 
not allege that the Commission has not been diligent in 
representing the State's interests. In these circumstances, 
the localities have no right to intervene in this proceeding 
because their interests are already adequately represented. 
See, e.g., Bush v. Viterna, 740 F.2d 350, 351-54 (5th Cir. 
1984) (denying motion of Texas Association of Counties to 
intervene in a civil rights action against the Texas 
Commission on Jail Standards because the Association and the 
Commission shared the same objective — upholding the existing 
standards of the Commission); Baker v. Wade, 743 F.2d 236, 243 
(5th Cir. 1984) (county attorney not entitled to intervene to 
defend constitutionality of a statute when state attorney 
general was already involved). 
Intervention, furthermore, was properly denied under 
the Commission's rules. Intervention of right is not allowed 
in Commission proceedings. Rather, the Commission has "wide 
discretion" in granting or denying permissive intervention. 
Utah Admin. R. R861-05A-G, H (1988). The Commission's rules 
provide that intervention will be granted "on the same basis 
as . . .described for consolidation of matters." Utah Admin. 
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R. R861-05A-H (1987) . 7 The conso l idat ion ru le , in turn, 
author izes conso l idat ion or intervent ion in the Commission's 
"wide d i s c r e t i o n " when c l o s e l y re la ted matters are pending. 
Utah Admin. R. R861-05A-G (1988) . 8 Quite importantly, 
however, the ru le s provide that the Commission "wi l l not 
force" in tervent ion , but instead w i l l afford a l l p a r t i e s "a 
separate hearing i f [they] so d e s i r e [ ] unless t h i s would 
involve such a number of hearings . . . [ that ] the publ ic 
7/ Utah Admin. R. R861-05A-H (1988) provides: 
Intervent ion. The Commission w i l l allow intervent ion 
on the same bas i s as . . . described for 
conso l idat ion of matters, upon the p e t i t i o n of the 
party seeking intervent ion. Any order permitting 
intervent ion s h a l l comply with the c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y 
provis ions of Utah law and sha l l respect the r ight of 
privacy of a l l taxpayers. 
8 / Utah Admin. R. R861-05A-G (1988) provides: 
Consolidation. The presiding o f f i c e r may allow 
conso l idat ion of matters when the same tax assessment 
or s e r i e s of assessments are involved in each, or 
where the fact s i t u a t i o n s and the l ega l questions 
presented are v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l . The Commission, 
however, w i l l not force such consol idat ion , and each 
party w i l l be e n t i t l e d to a separate hearing i f he so 
des ires unless t h i s would involve such a number of 
hearings on a s ing le fact s i t u a t i o n or point of law 
that expedit ious tax administration and the public 
i n t e r e s t would not be served. The Commission w i l l 
have a wide d i s c r e t i o n in allowing or refusing to 
allow conso l idat ion , and w i l l exerc i se i t s d i s c r e t i o n 
in the i n t e r e s t s of j u s t i c e and fa irness to c i t i z e n s 
of the s t a t e . No consol idat ion of matters s h a l l be 
required when such consol idat ion would have the 
e f f e c t of e l iminat ing any p r i v i l e g e recognized by 
law. 
interest would not be served," Id, Moreover, intervention 
will not be ordered where it would "have the effect of 
eliminating any privilege recognized by law" (Utah Admin- R. 
R861-05A-G (1988)). 
The Commission's denials of the localities' motions 
to intervene were eminently reasonable under the foregoing 
rules. Pursuant to those rules, Mountain Bell was entitled to 
a separate hearing because it had requested a separate hearing 
by opposing the motions to intervene. Moreover, as the 
Commission concluded, the interests of justice and fairness to 
the citizens of the state would be unimpaired by denying 
intervention. Furthermore, under the terms of the rules, the 
Commission's denial of the localities' requests for 
intervention was not merely reasonable — it was mandatory. 
The Commission has exclusive authority to ascertain and assess 
a taxpayer's sales and use tax liability. Because the 
localities have no authority to ascertain and assess that tax 
liability, the only possible benefit they could derive from 
intervention would be to obtain Mountain Bell's confidential 
tax returns. Those records, however, are protected from 
disclosure not only by the Commission's intervention rules, 
but also by statutes to be discussed below. Section III, 
infra. Therefore, it would have been an abuse of discretion 
for the Commission to have allowed the localities to 
intervene. 
Rather than d i scuss the i s sue of adequate 
representat ion and the p l a u s i b i l i t y of in tervent ion under 
Commission r u l e s , the l o c a l i t i e s argue that the Commission 
erred in denying intervent ion because they have ''standing" in 
t h i s d i spute . This argument evidences a b latant 
misunderstanding of the d i f ference between the p r i n c i p l e s of 
standing and in tervent ion . Standing i s a doctr ine intended to 
insure the procedural i n t e g r i t y of j u d i c i a l adjudicat ion by 
requiring that each of the p a r t i e s t o a lawsuit have a 
s u f f i c i e n t l y d i s c r e t e i n t e r e s t in the subject matter of the 
l i t i g a t i o n that the l e g a l and factual i s s u e s of the dispute 
w i l l be f u l l y explored. Terracor v . Board of State Lands & 
Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986) . 9 Intervent ion , on 
the other hand, i s a process whereby a party that claims an 
i n t e r e s t in the subject matter of a lawsuit already commenced 
by another party j o i n s that lawsuit for the purpose of 
protec t ing i t s own i n t e r e s t s . See Rule 24(a) U.R.Civ.P. 
(1987) . An intervenor, by d e f i n i t i o n , has standing. Not 
every party with standing, however, i s a proper intervenor. 1 0 
Therefore, the Commission's denial of the motions to intervene 
9/ Standing, by restricting cit izens without direct interest 
in a lawsuit from participating, is intended to prevent 
the judicial resolution of those disputes which could be 
more effect ively resolved by the legislature. Terracor. 
716 P.2d at 799. 
10/ Indeed, the simple fact that intervention is not always a 
matter of right i l lustrates that not a l l parties with 
"standing" are entit led to intervene in a particular case. 
was not an adjudication of standing and the localities' 
"standing" arguments are inapposite. 
Moreover, even if the issue of the localities' 
standing to participate in the Commission's appeal process 
were before this Court, this Court would be constrained to 
conclude that the localities lack standing. To establish 
standing, this Court requires a litigant to show that "he has 
suffered some distinct and palpable injury which gives him a 
personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute," or that 
"no one has a greater interest than he and [that] the issue is 
unlikely to be raised at all if the [litigant] is denied 
standing." Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 
454 (Utah 1985). The localities cannot satisfy either prong 
of this Court's standing analysis. 
The localities fail to satisfy the "distinct and 
palpable injury" test. The localities did not move to 
intervene in order to assert any adverse position with respect 
to any specific ground on which the Commission might have 
reduced Mountain Bell's tax liability. Rather, the 
localities' purpose in moving to intervene was simply to 
prevent the loss of a potential revenue stream by challenging 
the Commission's authority to exclusively conduct sales and 
use tax appeals. Such apparent adversity between the 
localities and the Commission is not sufficient to satisfy the 
"distinct and palpable injury" test. 
The localities' claim of adversity to the Commission, 
moreover, rests upon a serious distortion of the Commission's 
proceedings. The localities repeatedly assert that, with 
respect to Mountain Bell's audit and assessment, the 
Commission attempted to "compromise and settle tax obligations 
determined due and owing by its Auditing Division." See, 
e.g., Pet. Br. at 15. This argument mischaracterizes both the 
structure of the Commission and the actions of its Auditing 
Division. 
To fulfill its administrative responsibilities, the 
Commission is divided into component groups, each having 
assigned duties and each functioning at the behest and under 
the direction of the Commission. The Auditing Division is but 
one of these groups. Contrary to the localities' assertion, 
the Auditing Division is not separate and distinct from the 
Commission. The Auditing Division's function is to review and 
recommend, but not to ascertain or assess tax liability. 
Indeed, as regards Mountain Bell's tax liability, the Auditing 
Division — in its own words — had merely examined Mountain 
Bell's records and made "proposed adjustments." Record at 
191. As a result, the Commission proceeding initiated by 
Mountain Bell is designed to ascertain and assess — not 
"compromise" — tax liability. 
In State Tax Commission v. Katsis, 62 P.2d 120, (Utah 
1936), the Commission asserted, as the localities now claim, 
that a sales and use tax notice of deficiency prepared and 
signed by a Commission auditor constituted the ascertainment 
and assessment of sales and use tax liability. Id. at 123. 
This Court rejected that argument, holding specifically that 
the notice of deficiency was not an ascertainment and 
assessment of the sales and use tax liability. Rather, the 
ascertainment of the amount of tax liability and the actual 
assessment of that tax liability, being quasi-judicial 
functions, may be performed only by the four statutory members 
of the Commission itself. Accordingly, tax liability is not 
ascertained until after the Commission "reviews and estimates" 
the tax deficiency and is not assessed "until it can stand as 
a tax and can be sued upon." Id. 
Now, as when Katsis was decided, a notice of 
deficiency does not constitute the ascertainment of a tax 
liability or a tax which can be sued upon until after the 
Commission has adjudicated any objections by the taxpayer and 
issued its final order. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-114 
(1987) . "Any taxpayer may file a request for agency action, 
petitioning the commission for redetermination of a 
deficiency." id. § 59-1-501. It is only after a 
redetermination by the Commission that "the entire amount 
redetermined as the deficiency . . . shall be assessed 
. . . ." Id. § 59-1-503(1). In this case, the Commission did 
not, as the localities repeatedly assert (Pet. Br. at 7-8), 
enter a final order and then arbitrarily choose not to collect 
the tax thereby assessed. Rather, the administrative appeal 
in which the localities attempted to intervene and of which 
they now complain, was the Commission's normal appeals process 
in which sales and use tax liability is ultimately determined. 
Thus, contrary to the arguments made by the localities, the 
Commission did not compromise a previously determined tax 
because the tax had not been finally assessed. 
But, even if the localities were able to claim 
adversity because the Commission somehow "compromised" 
Mountain Bell's tax liability, that showing is ultimately 
insufficient to demonstrate the "distinct and palpable injury" 
essential to standing. The localities claim a reduction in 
their local sales and use tax revenues as their injury. Pet. 
Br. at 14. That injury, however, were it to occur, would not 
be distinct and palpable because it would be shared to a 
greater extent by the State and by all each of the 2 58 other 
local governmental units that participate in the Local Sales 
and Use Tax distribution. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin. 422 
U.S. 490, 499-502 (1975) ("a 'generalized grievance' shared in 
substantially equal measure by all or a large class . . . does 
not warrant exercise of jurisdiction"). 
Because the localities fail to satisfy the "distinct 
and palpable injury" test for standing, they can establish 
standing only if they demonstrate that "no one has a greater 
interest" than they in challenging the Commission, and that 
the Commission's alleged wrongdoing "is unlikely to be raised 
at all" unless raised by them. Kennecott Corp., 702 P.2d at 
454. The l o c a l i t i e s fa i l to meet th is t e s t . Contrary to 
their submission, the l o c a l i t i e s do not have a "greater" 
interest in the proper ascertainment, assessment and 
col lect ion of local sales and use taxes than does the State. 
The l o c a l i t i e s attempt to mislead this Court into believing 
that only Local Sales and Use Tax revenues are reduced if the 
Commission ascertains that a taxpayer's actual tax l i a b i l i t y 
i s l e s s than the amount set forth in the notice of deficiency. 
Such i s not the case, however. The State generally has a five 
times greater financial stake in sales and use tax revenues — 
which i t i s not l ike ly to jeopardize — than do the combined 
260 local governmental units that participate in the local 
sales and use tax distribution. Record at p. 40. For every 
dollar of sales and use tax assessed which the Commission 
resolves in favor of taxpayers, the State loses $.80, compared 
to a l l 260 l o c a l i t i e s ' combined loss of $.20, of which only 
$.07 would be distributed to l o c a l i t i e s involved in this 
appeal.11 The l o c a l i t i e s , therefore, cannot sat is fy either of 
the accepted t e s t s for standing. 
11/ For the year beginning on July 1, 1986 and ending June 30, 
1987, the City received a $19,615,525.26 d i s t r ibut ion and 
the County received a $13,508,183.40 d i s t r ibut ion of l oca l 
sa l e s and use tax revenue, for a combined to ta l of 
$33,123,300.65. The t o t a l amount of loca l sa l e s and use 
tax revenue d i s tr ibuted by the Commission for the tax year 
was $107,979,058.01. Therefore, because the loca l 
governmental u n i t s ' share of the sa les and use tax i s l e s s 
than o n e / f i f t h of the S t a t e ' s share, the Ci ty ' s and the 
County's combined f inancia l stake in 1987 sa le s and use 
tax revenue was approximately one- f i f teenth of the S ta te ' s 
i n t e r e s t . 
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Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the 
Commission properly denied the localities' motions to 
intervene. This Court, furthermore, should accord substantial 
deference to the procedural ruling of the Commission denying 
intervention. Contrary to the localities' request for review 
under a "clearly erroneous" standard, it is well established 
in this state that courts will not substitute their judgment 
for the discretionary rulings of administrative agencies. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-16(h) (Supp. 1988); Smith v. Turner, 
362 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1961). See also Petty v. State Board 
of Regents, 595 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Utah 1979) (administrative 
agencies are given "wide latitude" to carry out their 
statutory duties); In re Tanner, 549 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah 
1976). A court may overturn discretionary action only where 
it is so oppressive or unreasonable that it must be deemed 
capricious and arbitrary. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-16(h) 
(Supp. 1988) ; Salt Lake City Corp. v. Dept. of Employment 
Security, 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah 1982); Petty v. State 
Board of Regents, 595 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1979). That standard is 
plainly not met here. 
E. Intervention By Local Taxing Jurisdictions Into 
Commission Proceedings Would Disrupt The Efficient 
Operation Of The State's Taxing Scheme 
The preceding subsections of this brief have 
demonstrated: (1) the Commission has plenary authority to 
ascertain, assess and collect both state and local sales and 
use taxes; (2) that nothing in the structure of the local 
sales and use tax derogates or diminishes this plenary 
authority; (3) that the localities have in fact contracted 
with the Commission to perform all functions relating to the 
administration of local sales and use taxes; and (4) that the 
Commission properly exercised its discretion to deny the 
localities7 motions to intervene. These facts alone are 
sufficient to compel affirmance of the Commission. The Court, 
however, should affirm for one additional — and vitally 
important — reason: intervention by local taxing 
jurisdictions into Commission proceedings would improperly 
disrupt the efficient operation of the State's entire taxing 
scheme. 
The Commission possesses unique expertise in the tax 
area, particularly the sales and use tax area. The Commission 
assists the legislature in formulating tax policy and 
proposing and commenting on legislation. It has the 
responsibility for promulgating regulations and interpreting 
the tax statutes, including the statute which establishes the 
state sales and use tax base. It has the responsibility for 
auditing the tax returns of the taxpayers of the state. 
Accordingly, to promote consistency and uniform application of 
the state sales and use tax law, the Commission must have 
plenary and sole authority to administer the state sales and 
use tax. The localities, in fact, cannot (and do not) dispute 
the Commission's authority to administer the state sales and 
use tax. 
To properly carry out legislative intent, the 
Commission must possess parallel authority to administer and 
interpret both the Local Sales and Use Tax and the State Sales 
and Use Tax. Otherwise, it would be impossible to maintain 
the uniformity and consistency in these two taxes mandated by 
the legislature. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-204 (Supp. 1988). 
Allowing local governmental units to administer their own 
sales and use tax ordinances would lead to unnecessary and 
expensive duplication as well as the likelihood for differing 
interpretations of the same tax law. For this reason, the 
legislature has seen fit to require local governmental units 
to contract with the Commission for the administration of, and 
all other functions incident to the operation of, the local 
sales and use tax. 
The localities clearly understand and accept the 
Commission's legislative authority and its requisite expertise 
to administer state and local sales and use tax issues. This 
understanding is manifested by the localities' failure to take 
any action over the last thirty years to establish any appeal 
and assessment mechanism of their own. Neither Salt Lake City 
nor Salt Lake County has auditors trained to review sales and 
use tax returns or any other sales and use tax ascertainment 
and assessment procedures. 
The localities' position, if adopted by this Court, 
would destroy the uniformity and consistency mandated by the 
legislature. The 1987 Tax Commission Annual Report indicates 
that over 260 local governmental units impose local sales and 
use tax and participate in the distribution and sharing of 
sales and use tax revenues. The proposition that each of 
these 2 60 units should be able to intervene in the 
Commissions's quasi-judicial appeal process and that each has 
authority to prevent any assessment that does not conform with 
its own interpretation of the sales and use tax laws is 
irrational. In fact, the localities' arguments contradict the 
specific statutory intent of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-204, which 
reserves to the Commission the sole authority to administer 
all aspects of the Utah Local Sales and Use Tax Act. To give 
any credibility whatsoever to the localities' position would 
be to agree that the localities have the authority to 
independently define their sales and use tax base, rather than 
requiring such tax base to be wholly dependent on the state 
tax base. Indeed, intervention by the localities would be 
unmanageable, with neither the Commission nor the legislature 
having any control whatsoever over total sales and use tax 
policy. 
Finally, allowing such intervention would be patently 
unfair to taxpayers with statewide operations such as Mountain 
Bell, who, in any sales and use tax appeal, would have to 
counter the arguments not only of the Commission and the 
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Attorney General, but also the arguments of up to 260 local 
governmental units. The system that the localities urge this 
Court to establish would be unreasonably cumbersome and 
expensive for all parties involved, i.e., the State, the 
legislature, local governmental units and taxpayers. Under 
the localities' proposal, each time a taxpayer seeks to 
challenge a notice of deficiency, 260 local governmental units 
would be entitled to receive notice, to audit the taxpayers' 
records, to file pleadings and to enter appearances in the 
appeal. As a result, each taxing jurisdiction could define a 
different tax base than the Commission. In addition, each 
local governmental unit would be able to decide for itself 
whether any tax was due, as well as the amount of that tax. 
This result is untenable. 
III. SALT LAKE CITY AND SALT LAKE COUNTY ARE NOT ENTITLED TO 
REVIEW MOUNTAIN BELL'S CONFIDENTIAL TAX RECORDS 
From the initiation of the administrative proceedings 
relevant to Mountain Bell's assessment, Salt Lake County has 
unsuccessfully sought review, first, of Mountain Bell's 
initial protests to the statutory notices of deficiency and, 
subsequently, of any and all documents relating to Mountain 
Bell's audit, assessment and appeal. Record at 1, 122. In 
support of its repeated requests, Salt Lake County argued that 
the provisions of the agreement executed on June 11, 1975 
between Salt Lake County and the Commission granted Salt Lake 
County the right to examine taxpayer returns and related 
documents. 
The confidentiality of Mountain Bell's sales and use 
tax returns is protected by Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-403 (1987), 
which provides in relevant part: 
Any tax commissioner, agent, clerk, or other 
officer or employee of the commission may not 
divulge or make known in any manner any 
information gained by him from any return filed 
with the commission . . . . 
The localities do not dispute that Mountain Bell's tax return 
and related documents are protected by this statute. Instead, 
they argue that the agreement, subject to the confidentiality 
requirements of section 59-1-403, gives them the authority to 
review Mountain Bell's tax return and related documents. Such 
an argument is unavailing, as the Commission concluded. 
In its Order of May 26, 1988, the Commission held 
that, in light of section 59-1-403 and the rules promulgated 
thereunder, the county could be allowed to review the taxpayer 
and Commission records only "to determine that sales tax 
revenues have been appropriately allocated and distributed to 
the respective cities and counties." Record at 39. The 
Commission's conclusion was based on its interpretation of 
section 59-1-403 and its own rules regarding confidentiality. 
The Commission reasoned that, because it was vested with the 
exclusive authority to ascertain, assess and collect sales and 
use taxes, the only "official purpose" for which a local 
governmental unit could have access to taxpayer and Commission 
data was to assure proper allocation of local sales and use 
taxes. That determination is entitled to deference and may be 
reversed only if obviously arbitrary. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46(b)-16(h) (Supp. 1988); McKniaht v. State Land Board. 
381 P.2d 726, 730 (Utah 1963). 
The localities next point to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-1-403(3)(b) (1987), as an exception to the 
confidentiality provisions of section 59-1-403. Section 
59-1-403(b), which grants localities limited access to 
taxpayer returns and related documents, provides (emphasis 
added): 
Notwithstanding Subsection (1) and for all taxes 
except individual income tax and corporate 
franchise tax, the commission may, by rule, 
share information gathered from returns and 
other written statements with the federal 
government, and any other state, any of their 
political subdivisions, or any political 
subdivision of this state, if these political 
subdivisions or the federal government grant 
substantially similar privileges to this state. 
The localities' argument regarding the application of this 
statute is unclear. They assert, on the one hand, that the 
agreements come within the provisions of section 
59-1-403(3)(b) and that the Commission therefore should 
"share" Mountain Bell's tax returns and related information 
with them. That argument is unfounded, however, because the 
agreements do not constitute a "rule" relating to the 
disclosure of tax information as required by section 
59-1-403(3)(b) for the simple reason that the execution of the 
contracts did not constitute "rulemaking." Among other 
things, execution of the contracts was not preceded by public 
review and comment. 
Alternatively, the localities assert that the 
agreements they entered into with the Commission, read in 
conjunction with certain rules of the Commission, require the 
Commission to disclose Mountain Bell's tax return and related 
documents. The localities rely upon Commission Rules 
R861-12A-E and -F (1988). Neither of those subsections, 
however, substantiates the arguments the localities assert. 
To begin with, subsection E deals specifically with 
reciprocal agreements for the exchange of information between 
public agencies. The agreements between the localities and 
the Commission are not the type of reciprocal agreements this 
subsection is intended to address. Subsection E of the 
Commission rules further states that disclosure of information 
pursuant to a reciprocal agreement will not be permitted if 
such a disclosure violates "any statute." Utah Admin. R. 
R861-12A-E (1988). Disclosure of Mountain Bell's tax return 
and related documents would violate the confidentiality 
provisions of section 59-1-403(1). Therefore, even if the 
agreements were viewed as reciprocal agreements entered into 
in accordance with Tax Commission Rule R861-12A-E(1988), 
disclosure of Mountain Bell's confidential tax returns and 
related documents would not be allowed. 
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Subsection F does relate to agreements for the 
disclosure of confidential tax returns and information. The 
first sentence of Subsection F, however, states that "[t]he 
Commission may provide departments and political subdivisions 
of the State of Utah with copies of returns and other 
information required by Chapter 12 of Title 59." Utah Admin. 
R. R861-12A-F (1988) (emphasis added). Therefore, the 
disclosure of information pursuant to Subsection F is 
permissive, not mandatory. Moreover, information requested 
under Subsection F will be made available only in "official 
matters" and must be requested in writing, signed by the "head 
of the department or political subdivision." Ld. Subsection 
F, furthermore, requires only that the Commission respond to a 
local governmental unit's request in writing, not that it 
provide the requested information. Id. In order to allow the 
Commission to determine whether to exercise its discretion to 
release or withhold the requested information, any written 
request must "specifically indicate the information being 
sought and how the information will be used." Id 
The Commission's refusal to release Mountain Bell's 
tax returns and related documents was not an abuse of 
discretion. Pet. Br. 18. Salt Lake County's letter of 
February 4, 1988, which sought confidential Mountain Bell 
information, failed to comply with the requirements of 
Subsection F. That letter was not a request made by the 
appropriate department head and contained no explanation of 
the purpose for which the information was to be used. See 
Record at 45-46. In fact, Salt Lake County's sole purpose in 
seeking to obtain Mountain Bell's tax return and related 
documents was to "second guess" the Commission in its 
application and interpretation of the sales and use tax law. 
CONCLUSION 
The appeal should be dismissed as moot. 
Alternatively, the Court should affirm the Commission's order 
denying the localities' motions to intervene. The Utah 
Constitution and the Utah sales and use tax laws give the 
Commission plenary authority to administer sales and use taxes 
to the exclusion of the local governments. In the exercise of 
that authority the Commission properly denied the localities' 
motions to intervene and refused to allow the County to review 
Mountain Bell's confidential taxpayer information. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of September, 
1989. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
By A ^ /W4 ' 
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R865-19-90S Telephone Service Defined Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 
53-12-104 
A. "Telephone service" means the transmission for hire of signs, signals, 
writings, images, sounds, messages, data, or other information of any nature 
by wire, radio, light waves, or other electromagnetic means, and includes 
the following: 
B. Nonrecurring telephone service charges are telephone service charges 
which are ordinarily charged to subscribers only once or only under 
exceptional circumstances. 
1. Nonrecurring telephone service charges Include, but are not limited 
to, charges for: initially establishing telephone service; changing the 
type of telephone service being provided; changing the types of features, 
options, or enhancements being provided in connection with a particular type 
of telephone service; disconnecting the subscriber's telephone service; 
disconnecting a feature or features being provided with a subscriber's 
telephone service; analyzing or repairing the cause of malfunctions in a 
subscriber's telecommunications equipment, apparatus or system; and 
installing on a subscriber's premises telecommunication equipment or 
apparatus which does not become a fixture of real property. 
2. Nonrecurring telephone service charges exclude, but not by way of 
limitation, charges for subscriber's premises telecommunications equipment 
or apparatus which becomes a fixture of real property, such as the 
installation of Inside wire, subscriber deposits, interest, late charges, 
contributions in aid of construction, land development fees, payments in 
lieu of land development fees and special plant ronstruction and facilities 
relocation charges. 
3. Nonrecurring services Involving real property transactions shall be 
taxed in accordance with rule R865-19-58S. 
C. Subscriber line charges, regardless of how they may be referred to in 
the future, for telephone service that were referred to or created by 
Federal Communication Commission in FCC Docket Number 78-72, are telephone 
service. 
D. This rule has retrospective applications to July 1, 1988. 
KEY: taxation, sales tax, telephone 
3/17/1983 53-12-103 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESOLUTION 
1989 
GENERAL SESSION 
Enrolled Copy 
S. J. R. No. 12 By Lyle W. Hillyard 
A JOINT RESOLUTION OF THE LEGISLATURE ASKING THE STATE TAX COMMISSION TO 
STUDY THE TAXATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, PARTICULARLY 
INTERSTATE TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND CARRIER ACCESS, AND TO REPORT ITS 
FINDINGS TO THE REVENUE AND TAXATION INTERIM COMMITTEE DURING THE 
1989 INTERIM; DIRECTING THE INTERIM COMMITTEE TO MAKE A 
RECOMMENDATION PURSUANT TO THIS STUDY AND TO RECEIVE INPUT FROM 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROVIDERS AND USERS; AND EXPRESSING LEGISLATIVE 
INTENT THAT IF THESE SERVICES ARE ULTIMATELY TAXED SUCH TAXATION 
HAVE PROSPECTIVE EFFECT ONLY. 
Be it resolved by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
WHEREAS the telecommunications industry has changed dramatically in 
the past few years with the introduction of sophisticated new 
technologies, a variety of new and enhanced service offerings, and a 
growing market for a wide range of telecommunications services; 
WHEREAS there are different federal, state, and local taxes imposed 
upon telecommunications and there are recent court rulings and pending 
litigation to determine the appropriate method of taxing 
telecommunications; 
WHEREAS the dynamics of the industry necessitate a review of existing 
laws governing the taxation of the telecommunications industry, including 
S. J. R. No. 12 
the tax treatment of interstate telecommunications and carrier access; 
WHEREAS the importance of the telecommunications industry and the 
many changes that have occurred require the state of Utah to carefully 
study these issues in order to develop a fair tax policy; 
WHEREAS the State Tax Commission is also examining these issues and 
should be prepared to provide invaluable assistance to the Legislature in 
making policy, 
WHEREAS telecommunications providers and users can also provide 
invaluable input to help the Legislature determine tax policy in this 
area. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the State Tax Commission 
carefully examine all the issues surrounding the tax treatment of 
interstate telecommunications and carrier access, including the effect, 
both positive and negative, that any change in tax treatment would have 
on the state, and seek and receive input from telecommunications 
providers and users in making this examination; 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the State Tax Commission make a full and 
complete report to the Legislature's Revenue and Taxation Interim 
Committee, not later than its October 1989 meeting, on the examination of 
these issues; 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Legislature's Revenue and Taxation 
Interim Committee, in addition to receiving the report of the State Tax 
Commission, also receive input from telecommunications services providers 
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and users of telecommunications services on the tax treatment of 
interstate telecommunications, including WATS lines, 800 numbers, and 
others, and on the tax treatment of carrier access} 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that in examining telecommunications tax 
issues, the Legislature's Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee also 
review, among other things, other states' tax treatment of the industry, 
relevant court rulings, and the economic effect of varying levels of 
taxation on industry and consumers in the state; and that it seek input 
from, among others, the State Tax Commission, the Department of Community 
and Economic Development, telecommunications providers, and consumers; 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Revenue and Taxation Interim 
Committee make a recommendation on the tax policy for telecommunications 
to the Legislature for consideration at the 1990 General Session, whose 
ultimate duty and responsibility is to make tax policy for the state of 
Utah; 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that no matter what the committee recommends 
and no matter what the State Tax Commission policy is, whether stated by 
rule or otherwise, it is the express intent of the Legislature that if 
either or both interstate telecommunications or carrier access is taxed, 
such tax shall be imposed on a prospective basis only, and not 
retroactively. 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that this resolution does not impact tax 
payments that are currently being collected. 
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UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
ISO East Third South 
Salt Lik« dry, UtihMlM 
Clydt Nlcholt )t. 
Eaacutive Director 
May 1 1 , 196* 
I. H. Hirutn, Out/man 
lOftrO Ttw, Commissioner 
Jo* I fichtoo, Commissioner 
C. Bltinc Davit, Commiiiwr.tr 
In raply rafar to$ 
Mountain Statai Telephone and Talegraph Jaff KcKamer 
P.O. Bos 1984 Phone Ho. (101) 330-6183 
1601 California St. MBC 3130 felea Tax Acct* Ho. 89033 
Denver, CO 80201 Audit Period 01/83 to 03/86 
SXCOHD STATUTORY VOTICI 
Attached are the finding! of the Auditing Divieion relative to your talaa 
tax liability aa determined after an examination of your recorde. 
Xf you do not agree, you may appeal purtuant to the provieiona of Utah Coda 
Ann. $$39-1.501 and 63~46b»3. 
The following appeal procedurea ara available to yout 
1* You may requeet a Division Conference with the Auditing Diviaion in an 
effort to clarify and narrow the iaauet and problama involved. Thia 
conference will be conducted on an Informal basis. 
2. If you do not want a Division Conference or the conference does not 
resolve thia matter, and you vent to puraue your appeal righta, you 
must file a Petition for Redetarmination within 30 days of tha mailing 
data of thia lattar to protect your appeal righta under the law. A 
copy of thia Statutory Notice pusfr be attached to your Petition for 
Redetermination. The Tax Commits ion haa no authority to consider your 
Petition if it is not filed within this 30 day period, even though a 
Division Conference ia requested. 
3. You have the right to request a hearing before the Tax Ccaomittion to 
orally present evidence, legal authority, and argument, prior to the 
Tax Commission's rendering a decialon on your Petition for 
Redetermination. The request for a hearing must be made in the 
Patition for Redetermination. If a haaring ia not raquattad, tha Tax 
Commissioners will then render a decision based upon the evidence and 
arguments before it. 
Mountain States Telephone »nd Telegraph 
Page 2 
Hay 11, 1980 
4. Your Petition for Redetermination must be set forth as outlined in the 
attached form. 
Zf jou file a Petition for Redetermination, the Auditing Divieion shall 
respond vith an Answer to Petition for Redetermination to apprise you of tha 
nature of its defenses and tha facta it raliei upon for affirmative relief 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. |63-46b-S. 
Unless you file a Petition for Redetermination as described above within 
the required 30 days, this Statutory Hotiee will constitute a final 
determination. 
Your prompt response is needed in order to protect your appeal rights. 
U7AI ITATI VAX C0KKIS8I0V 
Vf ernes I. RogerVX CPA 
Director, Auditing Division 
9RCWO/beg/9ncvo. sdd 
Enclosure 
MOTXCS 
If you have any questions contact the person below or return a copy of this 
letter^ with your Petition for Redetermination toi 
UTA1 ITATI TAX COKKI88IOM 
Auditing Division 
180 Bast Third louth 
lalt Lake City, UT 141)4-2200 
Attentioni Jeff McHetnar 
AMENDED 
SALES AND USE TAX AUDIT SUMMARY 
FOR THE PERIOO 
01/01/83 - 03/31/86 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. 
Mountain Bell 
P.O. Box 1984 
1801 California St. MBC 3130 
Denver, Colorado 80201 
Report Otte: OS/11/89 
Account Umber: 89033 
Examining Officers: 
Julie A. Jones 
Richard Marchant 
Dennis Mitchell 
Reference Additional Tax 
Exhibit A $0.00 
Exhibit B $0.00 
*Note: Interest Computed To t 
Dally Interest Amount: 
Penalty 
$0.00 
$0.00 
Grand Total 
01/25/89 
$0.00 
Interest* 
$0.00 
$0.00-
Total Aart. Due 
$0.00 
$0.00-
$0.00 
REMARKS: 
This portion of the audit dealing with lono distance phone co«pany 
access charges is cancelled pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution #12 
dated February 2, 1989. 11 such charges are determined to be taxable, 
treatment will be on a prospective basis only. 
